Alongside these various political and economic crises, however, exists a second, more dynamic Italy. Although often obscured by the negative portrayals of the country, the existence of this second Italy is confirmed by a series of comparative statistics that indicate that Italy in the late 1980s outperformed most of its more "efficient" and "stable" neighbors in terms of growth of exports and GDP, labor productivity, firm profitability, investment in new machinery and equipment, and the accumulation of personal savings.
5
Italy's economic performance undoubtedly declined in the early 1990s, due to the global recession and the country's domestic difficulties, but its economy is still far more vital than most popular accounts would suggest. For example, in a variety of diverse sectors, including machine tools, automobiles, specialty steels, textiles and apparel, and ceramic tiles, Italian producers remain major exporters in world markets. 6 3 For more on Italy's growing debt, see Vincent Della Sala, "The Italian Budgetary Process: Political and Institutional Constraints," West European Politics, vol. 11, no. 3, (July 1988), pp. 110-125 . For an interesting analysis of the fall 1992 currency crisis, see Kevin Muehring, et. al, "Currency Chaos: The Inside Story," International Investor, October 1992. 4 For more on the Leqa, see Renato Mannheimer, La Leqa Lombarda, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991) ; and Dwayne Woods, "The Centre No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues in Italian Politics," West European Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, (April 1992) : pp. 56-76.
5 For more on Italian growth rates in comparative perspective, see OECD, Main Economic Indicators, (Paris : OECD, 1993) . Data on productivity growth are reported in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data Diskette, December 1992. Machinery and Equipment expenditures are reported in OECD, Historical Statistics, (Paris : OECD, 1992 ). Personal savings rates can be found in the Handbook of International Statistics 1992 , (Washington, D.C., September 1992 . 6 In the late 1980s, Italy's national champion in automobiles, Fiat, ranked second only to Volkswagen in number of autos produced in Europe. Since then, Fiat, along with other leading European automobile manufacturers (e.g., Volvo, Volkswagen), has experienced challenges to its competitiveness. Nonetheless in 1992, Fiat remained the sixth largest automobile manufacturer in the world. (See Automotive News, May 26, 1993, p. 3) . Italian producers hold about 10% world This essay seeks to explain the apparent paradox behind these two contrasting images of Italy while at the same time advancing an alternative approach to the study of comparative political economy. In contrast to the dominant approach which sees nation-states or "national systems" as the basic unit of analysis and seeks to explain cross-national variation in economic performance by focusing on particular institutional arrangements and/or patterns of state-society relations, my alternative micro-political analysis emphasizes the internal heterogeneity of national economies and the "embeddedness" of economic activity in local socio-political networks. In this alternative view, national political economies are not coherent systems but rather incoherent composites of diverse subnational patterns that coexist (often uneasily) within the same national territory.
7
The micro-political approach explains how within the same national economy one can identify both patterns of entrepreneurial dynamism and industrial decline. Although present within the same country, these divergent patterns are situated in very different local economies, which are, in turn, characterized by alternative patterns of associationalism, intergroup relations, political representation, and economic governance. In Italy, firms and industries situated in localities with particular socio-political attributes (e.g., dense networks of well-developed associations and interest groups capable of aggregating diverse interests, mediating industrial conflict, and diffusing information) adjusted more successfully 8 to changing world markets than did other companies embedded market share in textiles and apparel (see International Trade and Statistics Yearbook and Data, 1991) ; 27% world market share (52% European market share) in ceramic tiles (see I Sole 24 Ore, May 31, 1993, p. 3); over 11% world market share in machine tools (fourth largest producer, after Japan, Germany and the United States, see American Machinist, February, 1993, pp. 33-77) ; and about 25% of the European market for specialty steels (number two spot, after Germany, see Margherita Balconi, La sideruqia italiana (1975 , (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991, p. 473) .
in areas with different historical legacies and more limited local resources.
Viewing the Italian economy as a complex composite of diverse local systems helps us not only to reintegrate the two contrasting images of Italy, but also to understand some of the country's current difficulties. Because the massive wave of industrial restructuring that swept across the Italian economy in the 1980s had such divergent consequences for the country's various subnational economies, socioeconomic disparities within Italian society increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, differences in income, employment, and the quality of social services between the developed North and the less developed South (and even among various regions of the South) --differences that appeared to be narrowing in the 1970s --actually increased in the 1980s. 9 Through various government-funded programs the Italian state sought to compensate for these growing socioeconomic disparities and hold together the country's divergent subnational economic orders. Yet the costs of these programs have strained the Italian political economy and provoked a major fiscal/macroeconomic crisis and a political backlash against the central government --especially by the Leqa
Nord which seeks to dismember the Italian state into a loose confederation of macropolitical regions. °B y creating a more costly and uncertain business environment, these macroeconomic and political crises may threaten to undermine even the more successful Italian regional economies.
9 For more on these trends, see CENSIS, 25 Rapporto Sulla Situazione Sociale Del Paese 1991 , (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1992 . For more on differences within the South, see Simona Piattoni, "Re-interpreting Clientalism: Local Economic Development in the Italian South," Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Department of Political Science, MIT.
10 The Leqa's proposal for a reconfiguration of the Italian state into a looser federation of regions is remarkably similar to what certain Meridionalisti at the turn of the last century advocated as well. These earlier federalists argued that increased local and regional autonomy was essential for the economic and civic development of the Italian South. For more on this, see Carlo Trigilia, Sviluppo senza autonomia. Effetti perversi delle politiche del Mezzoqiorno, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992) . See also Gian Enrico Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere una nazione, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993) .For more on the recurrent debates within Italian history over the degree of centralization vs. local autonomy in Italy, see various essays in Luigi De Rosa and Ennio Di Nolfo, Reqionalismo e centralizzazione nella storia di Italia e Stati Uniti, (Florence, Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1986) .
To the extent that other national governments also appear to have lost macroeconomic control over their economies," and given that today, countries as diverse as Sweden, Germany, and the United States --national systems Italians once sought to emulate --are beginning to resemble Italy in terms of institutional fragmentation and economic decentralization, the Italian case may provide more general lessons for students of comparative political economy.
The remainder of this paper develops this argument about the way different ll For a provocative essay on this issue, see Sabino Cassese, "Oltre lo Stato ; i Limiti dei Governi Nazionali nel Controllo dell'Economia," in Nazioni Senza Ricchezza, Ricchezze Senza Nazione, Francesco Galgano, Sabino Cassese, Giulio Tremonti and Tiziano Treu, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992) . political economy has focused on the institutional arrangements and/or patterns of state-society relations of different nation-states to explain divergent patterns of industrial development, decline, and adjustment.' 2 This approach stresses how individual nations with particular histories and varying positions in world markets develop specific institutional arrangements to govern their economies. More than simply describe institutional differences, this approach often assumes that certain "national systems" with particular organizational features are more "mature" and/or "efficient" than others and prescribes the active diffusion or replication of these "best (institutional) practices" across nations.
During the 1970s and 1980s, scholars and policy makers alike pointed to institutional arrangements associated with particular nation-states as the best way to reverse economic decline and promote industrial adjustment. Some suggested etatist France (Cohen, 1969; Zysman, 1977) and Japan (Johnson, 1982) with their highly technocratic state bureaucracies providing various forms of administrative guidance to leading economic sectors; others looked to northern European neocorporatist systems of centralized interest intermediation, peak-level bargaining, and Social Democratic politics (Schmitter, 1981; Cameron, 1984; Katzenstein, 1984) ; and still others to the United States, with a regulatory framework designed to promote free markets, competition, and individual entrepreneurship (Gilder, 1989 Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983) . that of France (Cassese, 1987; Shonfield, 1965: 196) ; historically liberal economic assumptions have guided its macroeconomic policy (Hildebrandt, 1965) ; and several industrial sectors and regions achieved various corporatist-like agreements (Perulli, 1984; Chiesi and Martinelli, 1989 ) --none of these elements has come to dominate the national political economy as a whole. Instead, because of its Byzantine institutional arrangements, the standard literature on European political economy often describes Italy as an "anomalous" or "exceptional" case.
Seen through the analytic lenses of the "national models" approach, Italy's current maladies are not at all surprising. In fact, they are to be expected given the country's "dysfunctional" institutions and "clientalistic" sociopolitical arrangements. What cannot so easily be accommodated within this dominant framework are the more dynamic features of the Italian economy. For accounts that emphasize the importance of national institutional arrangements it remains somewhat of a mystery how Italy --once seen as the "sick man" of Europe --managed to outperform its etatist, neocorporatist, and neoliberal neighbors throughout most of the 1980s.
Even when Italy's economic successes are acknowledged, they are often explained away as temporary or conjunctural phenomena: the product of favorable exchange rates, cheap oil prices, and rising unemployment (which, in turn reduces the militancy and cost of labor). Once these favorable conditions evaporate, so too will Italy's economic successes. This explains why despite several "fat" years in the 1980s, Italy's economic maladies have resurfaced. In other words, given that there were no major structural reforms of the Italian political economy, Italy remains essentially a "backward" and "inefficient" nation. Its economic successes were temporary anomalies, unlikely to be repeated in the near future.
While the "national models" approach to comparative political economy is useful in pointing out the important role national institutions play in regulating the political economy, its explanation for Italy's mixed economic performance may be too simple. Although this view captures Italian failures, the more vibrant aspects of the Italian economy cannot be simply written off as temporary or conjunctural phenomena. Barca and Magnani (1989 : 45) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986) . For more on the difficulties particular national labor features and modes of measurement pose for comparative studies of unemployment, see Joyanna Moy, "An Analysis of Unemployment and Other Labor Market Indicators in 10 Countries," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 111, no. 4, (April 1988) , pp. 39-50. not as an "anomalous" case but rather as a paradigmatic illustration of the "new competition" (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Goodman, 1989; Best, 1990; Inzerilli, 1990; Pyke, Becattini, Sengenberger, 1990) . This second view focuses primarily on Italy's industrial districts of dynamic small-and medium-sized firms. Citing the extremely high rates of growth and innovative firm strategies within these districts, this approach sees Italy's economic vitality as stemming from the ability of these highly specialized and flexible firms to compete successfully in world markets.
With time, so this second view goes, this alternative model of production will diffuse throughout the Italian economy and even to other national systems.
Far from being merely a passing phenomenon, Italian economic success represents the country's future. To the extent that this view acknowledges Italy's current difficulties, it explains them away as problems of transition, inherent in any major shift from one regime of production to another. increased by 21 percent. Employment within these firms rose almost 29 percent during these same years (Rey, 1989: 71) . During the 1970s, these same small-and medium-sized firms outperformed their larger counterparts in terms of growth of value added, investment, employment, and even average income per employee.
Absenteeism and industrial conflict were also lower in small-and medium-sized firms (Bellandi, 1989: 49) . These trends appear to have continued well into the 1980s (Rey, 1989: 79; Barca and Magnani, 1989: 171-197) .
Although this second view is important in illustrating the very real and significant role small firms and industrial districts played in the resurgence of Italy's economy in the 1980s, it too suffers from several shortcomings. Often these accounts exaggerate the importance of the industrial districts but rarely do they discuss some of the "darker sides" of small firm production systems (Harrison, 1994) . Moreover, not just small firms but also large enterprises contributed to Italy's economic revival in the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, many large firms that had previously been in trouble restructured themselves (sometimes even imitating certain flexible features associated with the industrial districts) and regained their competitiveness (Regini and Sabel, 1989) . By the end of the decade it appeared as if these larger firms were outpacing the small-firm sector in terms of productivity, profitability, and the ability to innovate (Barca and Magnani, 1989: 225-285; Consolati and Riva, 1989 ).
Finally, not all agglomerations of small firms produced economic growth, stable employment, and technical innovation. Some so-called districts failed outright while others degenerated into collections of sweat shops (Amin, 1989; Blim, 1990) . As some of the leading scholars of industrial districts have made clear, this model of economic development did not characterize all of Italy but only specific regions (Bagnasco, 1986 ) .14 The successful districts are concentrated primarily in the Center and Northeast of Italy. In these regions, commonly referred to as the "Third Italy", local entrepreneurs and unions were able to build on preexistent socio-political resources to promote high rates of economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. These same actors were also able to use their well-developed organizational capacities to obtain disproportionately large shares of government assistance (i.e., discounted loans, subsidized credits, etc.) which further enhanced industrial development in these regions (Weiss, 1988 ).
Thus, we have two accounts that explain pieces of the Italian puzzle but not the entire picture. Seen through the lenses of the "national models" approach, Italy's economic difficulties are easy to understand but its successes are less comprehensible. Conversely, accounts that focus on Italy's industrial districts shed light on the economy's dynamic features but tend to obscure many of the country's structural shortcomings. The alternative, micro-political explanation developed in this paper paints a more differentiated picture of the 14 Nor can this model of development be replicated wholesale in other industrial settings. In fact, some of the strongest proponents of this view are quite clear about its limits. See, for example, Michael J. Piores's "Response" to Ash Amin and Kevin Roberts in Industrial Districts and Inter-firm Cooperation in Italy, Frank Pyke, Giacomo Beccatini and Werner Sengenberger, eds., (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1990) , pp. 225-227 composed primarily of dynamic small-firm districts.
It is a heterogeneous composite of diverse subnational patterns that coexist within the same national territory. In contrast to accounts which focus on national institutional arrangements to explain differences in economic performance across nations, I look at the micro-level, at the strategic choices of the economic actors and how these choices are shaped by local socio-political networks, to understand diverse patterns of industrial politics within the same nation-state. (Tarrow 1977; Dente 1985) , the role of secondary associations and organized interest groups in democratic governance (Berger 1972; Cohen and Rogers 1992; Putnam 1992) , the importance of social and 19 Bagnasco (1977) identifies three dictinct socio-economic patterns associated with the three major territorial divisions (North, Center, and South) of the country but according to Paul Ginsborg, "...in purely historical terms it would be better to talk not of three Italys but of three hundred." (A History of Contemporary Italy: 3). Saville (1976) identifies seven different patterns whereas Sforzi (1989) divides the Italian economy into 955 distinct "local labor market areas". Political scientists have also wrestled with the problem of dividing Italy into distinct political areas. For an interesting review of this literature, see Roberto Cartocci, "Otto risposte a un problema: la divisione dell'Italia in zone politicamente omogenee," Polis, vol. 1, no. 3 (December 1987), pp. 481-514. political networks in structuring interactions among different individuals and groups (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter ,1982 Knoke 1990; Cohen and Dawson 1993) ; and the social, political, and institutional foundations of alternative production systems (Piore and Sabel 1984; Bagnasco 1988; and Streeck 1991) .
Revisitinq the Italian
Like Robert Putnam (1993) Thus when analyzing local economies in Italy, I have tried to pay attention not just to associational density but also to the qualitative features of the various local actors. Cohen and Rogers (1992) Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , 1982 has claimed that economic actors linked to one another through many "weak" ties will more easily be able to receive and transmit information than will actors linked by a few "strong" ties.
Building on both bodies of research I argue that local firms and unions are more likely to remain open and responsive organizations when they are tied to other like-minded entities through multiple, horizontal ties. Economic actors embedded in these dense but relatively egalitarian networks will more easily be able to share information, form alliances, build trust, 2 1 and resolve conflicts through negotiation than will other firms and unions situated in more fragmented or hierarchical networks. As a result, different socio-political networks will shape the understandings, resources, and hence the strategic choices of local economic actors in very different ways.
Policentric, polarized, and hierarchical local economies differ along three critical dimensions: the structure of intergroup relations, patterns of associationalism, and linkages to central policymakers. products. Closer examination of how this so-called "sun-set" industry, which was once closely identified with Italian "backwardness" (Frey, 1975) was reorganized into a highly competitive sector, sheds light on the more general process of industrial adjustment in Italy. As with the case of the automobile companies examined elsewhere, 2 3 Italian textile companies adjusted not in a uniform way, but by pursuing a variety of alternative strategies. Yet regardless of which strategy individual companies followed, all were shaped by their local settings.
In other words, the viability of the alternative strategic choices promoted by local managers and union leaders at individual firms depended as much on the underlying socio-political character of the local economy as on their own core competencies and resources. 
A Tale of Two Districts : Industrial Adjustment in Biella and Prato
During the 1970s the textile industries of most advanced industrial nations were in crisis. Changing patterns of international competition, increased labor costs, higher energy and raw material costs, more restrictive government environmental and safety regulations, and altered consumer tastes all combined to render obsolete the traditional model of economic development based on low wage, semi-skilled workers producing large series of low-medium quality standardized goods in integrated mills (OECD 1983; Toyne et. al. 1984) . The crisis of the textile industry in Western Europe and the United States appeared so severe that scholars and policymakers alike were beginning to theorize about a "new international division of labor" in which "mature" industries like textiles would be ceded to developing countries which possessed an abundance of low-wage, unskilled labor and thus, could manufacture labor-intensive products like textiles at lower costs (Froebel, Heinricks, Kreye, 1980; OECD, 1983) .
The Italian industry was hit particularly hard by this crisis for a variety of reasons, including the high costs of labor and credit, inefficient state intervention, structural weaknesses in the sector's productive structure, and the fragmentation of the industry's distributional networks (Turani, 1976; Federtessile, 1980) . As a result, Italian firms that had once dominated the 
Negotiated Restructuring in the Biellese
The Biellese, a small area located in the mountainous north-west section of Piedmont, is the birthplace of Italy's industrial revolution. The "Manchester of Italy," 2 7 this area consists of 83 small towns and villages and about 200,000
residents. Yet, despite its isolation and fragmentation, the Biellese area is a leader in the world's textile industry. Cooperation and collective innovation have not only improved product quality but also have altered production strategies. Each firm now produces specialized products for specific market niches. Moreover while Biellese textile firms are still quite competitive with one another and very protective of their autonomy, they nonetheless unite both to buy raw materials (setting up purchasing cartels) and to sell their finished goods (organizing a biannual fair, IdeaBiella, during which they display their latest products).
The unions played a significant role in these developments. Although most (but not all) restructured firms reduced their workforces, the transition from integrated to specialized production was usually negotiated with the union. The union had a say in who was let go or put in cassa integrazione and was consulted on plans to introduce new technologies. It also negotiated a territorial collective bargaining agreement with the local business association in order to extend union strength in certain firms to other weaker sectors of the workforce.
Not only did this territorial agreement protect workers, it also strengthened the unions by preventing whipsawing, enhancing workers' solidarity, and extending union agreements in large firms to newly formed smaller enterprises.
30
As a result, the decentralization of production that took place in this area did not undermine union strength. Workers who remained within the restructured firms were often retrained in the use of new process and product technologies while many who exited firms set up their own small businesses, buying machines from, and often working as subcontractors for, their original bosses.
Labor relations are not always tranquil in the Biellese area. There have been a number of strikes and even a few factory occupations. The local union is militant and factory owners are far from complacent about it. The point, however,
30 Based on interviews with the secretary of the Chamber of Labor, Biella, May 25, 1987. See also Marco Neiretti, ed., L'altra storia : sindacato e lotte nel Biellese, 1901 Ediesse, 1987) .
is that this process of radical economic change was negotiated by management and the unions. While both sides recognize their different interests and express very different ideologies, they nevertheless bargain and reach accords regulating the processes of industrial adjustment. As one local business leader put it, the unions and the managers united in a "pact for development" in order to save the local industry and preserve jobs. The major confrontations between labor and management occurred, not in restructured firms, but rather in those businesses that did not restructure and thus were forced to close. 31 Neiretti, L'altra storia.
32 Based on an interview with the head of the local business association, Unione Industriale Bielese, May 22, 1987. 3.3. The Rise and Decline of "Diffuse Industrialization": The Case of Prato Like Biella, the textile industry of Prato has a long historical tradition, dating back to the 14th and 15th centuries. And like Biella, the textile industry in Prato was characterized since the 19th century by a dual structure in which many small, family-operated firms co-existed with large integrated mills (e.g., the Fabbricone).
33 After World War Two, the larger mills fell into a deep crisis and were forced to restructure. Of a total of 25,000 textile workers employed in the Prato area, 6,500 were fired and 8,500 were transformed into part-time workers (Lorenzoni, 1980: 519) . In many cases, the owners of the ailing integrated mills sold or lent the idle looms to their redundant workers. As a result, between 1949 and 1954 the ratio of factory-operated to home-operated looms fell from 4:1 to 1:6 (Ritaine, 1990: 64) . This restructuring process created the conditions for a decentralized system of production with considerable capacities to respond flexibly to sudden fluctuations in demand. Demand growth led to increased subcontracting rather than new investment in plant and equipment. Conversely, the costs of a recession were spread over a larger number of small producers.
The emergence of this decentralized model of production in the 1950s was accompanied by the consolidation of particular economic actors (i.e. the impannatori or transformers). The impannatori designed the products, bought the raw materials, and distributed various phases of the production process among small, specialized producers --for example, rag-collectors (stracciaroli), spinners, warpers, weavers, dyers, finishers, etc. Moreover, they also coordinated all logistics and dealt with customers, both national and international (Lorenzoni, 1980) .
Until the 1950s, the Pratese district was specialized in the production of lana cardata (carded wool). This was produced through the regeneration of rags.
Due to the particular raw material employed, the Pratese textile firms traditionally produced standardized, low value-added products used for low 33 See Avigdor 1961 for more on Prato's history.
quality, dark men's suits and coats, or for military blankets and uniforms.
During the 1960s and the 1970s the impannatori engineered the strategic repositioning of the industry towards higher quality, multi-color fabrics (tessuti fantasia) which could be used in women's clothing. They also promoted the introduction of new technology and of new products using nylon-based fibers.
As a result of these innovations, the Prato textile district grew in population, employment, and turnover throughout the 1970s. (See Trigilia 1989 for more on this spectacular growth.) Its success was strictly tied to its capacity to increase product quality without compromising the quick response, efficiency, and flexibility associated with its decentralized organization of production.
However, the situation began to change in the second half of the 1980s.
Small artisanal firms declined rapidly in this period : From more than 15,000 in 1981 to around 10,000 today. Carded wool producers were particularly hard hit as is evidenced by the dramatic decline in carded wool production (from 70% of total production to 40%). Most observers explain Prato's dramatic shift in economic fortune as the product of failed cooperation among the local economic actors who were unable to develop a mutually agreeable way of regulating market entry and stabilizing demand. According to Harrison (1994) , the crisis of the Pratese textile district is due to the blocked circulation of information concerning market changes. While family or friendship ties favor the diffusion of innovations regarding production techniques and new technologies, the transfer of information about the evolution of demand clashes with an insurmountable limit: the social structure of production. In fact the role of the impannatori is one of pure intermediation between producers and clients. Their source of competitive advantage consists in the acquisition and exploitation of information concerning different buyers, the evolution of demand and of consumers' tastes, and the different degrees of technical efficiency achieved by various producers within the district. Faced with a radical contraction in demand, these intermediary actors have an incentive to retain, rather than circulate, this information, and thus to shift the burden of adjustment to the weaker smaller firms and artisans. In fact, the impannatori pit local producers both against one another and against external suppliers in an effort to cut costs and delivery times. In this way, a price war was sparked --a particularly difficult one for those artisans and small entrepreneurs who had invested in new technologies and were thus burdened by debt.
By describing this prisoner dilemma-like situation, where it is theoretically optimal for everybody to cooperate, but each actor individually finds it most convenient to defect, Harrison (1994) and trade unions is very high: Out of 1,000 workers 864 belong to one of these associations. This ratio is much higher than the national average of 392 out of 1000 (Ritaine 1990 : 70) . Membership in the employers' associations is less high:
In the mid-1980s only 55% of all firms were organized by employers' associations (Trigilia, 1989: 316) . However, this figure is higher now than it was in the early 1960s, when only 20% of the small firms and 45% of medium firms belonged to the employers' associations (Avigdor, 1961: 77) .
The "red" sub-culture exerts an important role of coordinating various working-class organizations and associations. In fact, the PCI-PDS has controlled, either by itself or in coalition with the Socialist party, all local, provincial and regional governments since WW II. The CGIL is by far the strongest trade union and PDS-affiliated cultural associations like the ARCI are very active in organizing public debates and conferences. The "red" pole embraces most of the smaller artisans as well. In 1986, artisans comprised about 17% of the PCI's total membership (Trigilia, 1989: 286) .
The second pole is constituted by an economic and financial elite, formed by the owners of larger woolen mills, the impannatori, and some of the richer artisans. Most of them are members of the Unione Industriali Pratese and have close ties with the local Cassa di Risparmio, which is in turn linked politically to the Christian Democratic Party. 34 Horizontal links between the two poles are almost non-existent. This is in part due to the radicalism of the "red" political sub-culture in Tuscany, as opposed to the more reformist spirit which prevails in near-by Emilia Romagna (Trigilia, 1986; Freschi, 1994) .
Industrial relations, although well-developed in Prato, did not manage to promote social integration among the local economic actors. In fact, during the 34 The disproportion between social control, exerted by the "red" pole, and economic power, in the hands of the alternative pole, is so great that the regional communist leadership decided to create a new financial institutions, i.e. Fiditoscana, to control directly the credit to the artisan sector (Ritaine, 1990: 71) .
1950s the reorganization of the local economy (away from vertical integration and towards decentralized production) took place against the strong opposition of the local trade unions. As a result, collective bargaining, which had been extremely lively soon after WWII, completely broke down and unionization rates among bluecollar workers dropped from about 90% to 64% between the early 1950s and the early 1960s (Trigilia, 1991: 303-5) . During the 1960s and 1970s, the unions were able to rebuild their strength and re-assert themselves within the local industry. However, both territorial and company-level collective agreements generally addressed only traditional issues, such as wages. In other words, the local trade unions have concentrated their energies and resources on "remunerated flexibility" and rarely engaged in negotiating over more qualitative issues such as work reorganization and flexible working time schedules (Trigilia, 1989: 312- 3).
This analysis of the underlying socio-political structure of the Pratese explains why all concerted attempts to improve the districts' competitiveness appeared to have failed (Balestri and Toccafondi, 1992) . On the one side, the economic and financial elite are only weakly coordinated by associations such as the Unione Industriali and the Cassa di Risparmio. On the other side, the "red" associative network espouses an ideological stance which renders cooperation with employers over industrial restructuring difficult. Since there are no structures for horizontal coordination, interactions between these two poles are purely contractual and top-level.
The contrast with Biella could not be greater. In the Biellese, the local industry relied upon the existence of a well-developed and horizontally structured network of socio-political groups and associations capable of coordinating strategies, diffusing information, and mediating conflicts among both the growing number of small and medium-sized firms as well as between the employers and the local unions. As a result, the increased fragmentation of the local industry did not lead to the productive overcapacity and under-investment in both new technologies and skill formation manifest in Prato. Instead, the reconfiguration of the local industry was regulated and somewhat offset by various arrangements (e.g., territorial collective bargaining agreements between the local union and employers association) and institutions (e.g., Banca Sella, the Centro Studi Oreste Rivetti, the Unione Industriale Biellese) which provided various collective and/or quasi-public goods (e.g., training, marketing and purchasing assistance, and technical advice) and mediated potential conflicts among the local social actors.
What mattered most, however, was not simply the overall number of local secondary associations --Prato has as many (if not more) local groups and clubs as Biella --but rather the way relations among these groups were structured.
Although the two districts possess similar (decentralized) industrial structures, their underlying socio-political structures differ significantly. In fact, the characteristics of the Biellese socio-political networks resemble the polycentric ideal type described above. A dense network of associations and interest groups are linked together by multiple, horizontal ties which facilitate communication and the pooling of resources among local economic actors. In contrast, the underlying socio-political structure of the Pratese approximates the polarized ideal type described above. Interest groups and associations cluster around two opposite poles, with very tenuous linkages to one another. Thus, communication and cooperation among local actors affiliated with either camp are extremely difficult to maintain and conflicts between the two often develop into zero-sum struggles.
In sum, the divergent strategic choices of individual firms and local unions in the two districts were shaped as much by the qualitative features of the socio-political context in which they were embedded as by their own organizational resources and capacities.
Conclusion: Beyond Italian Exceptionalism
The dominant paradigm in comparative political economy focuses on the institutional -arrangements and/or patterns of state-society relations of different nation-states to explain divergent patterns of industrial politics.
According to this view, national institutional arrangements are important because they shape the goals that organized interest groups like unions and business associations can pursue. National institutional arrangements structure not only the strategic interaction among economic actors but also their access to government policy making (Immergut, 1992) . As a result, scholars working within this tradition emphasize the institutional context of industrial politics, including the organizational characteristics of unions and business, the legal framework of industrial relations, the alternative systems of financial intermediation, and the linkages to the state. 
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~ ~ manner whereas companies embedded in localities with more limited local resources experienced more conflict. The point, in short, is that a variety of different subnational patterns of industrial politics coexist within Italy and that these localistic patterns are worthy of study.
But this is not only an Italian phenomenon. To the extent that other national governments also appear to have lost macroeconomic control over their economies, and given that today, countries as diverse as Sweden, Germany, and the United States --national models Italians once sought to emulate --are beginning to resemble Italy in terms of institutional fragmentation and economic decentralization, the Italian case may indeed provide more general lessons for students of comparative political economy. In fact, the plurality of patterns of industrial organization described in Italy appears to be present in other national economies as well. Gary Herrigel (1994) has described alternative patterns of industrial order in the German mechanical engineering industry and Annalee Saxenian (1994) has done the same for the American semiconductor sector. Only if one or a particular set of economic patterns emerges as dominant in a given country should we return to the convention of comparing industrial politics in terms of national models. If such a model or set of models is identified, we will be on our way toward reconstructing national models that highlight rather than obscure the dynamic relationship that exists between microlevel strategies and national regulatory institutions. If not, we must construct completely new typologies, based perhaps on more local patterns of industrial politics, to guide further comparative research and theorizing.
